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Bridging the Safe Drinking Water Gap for 
California’s Rural Poor 
By Camille Pannu* 
Spurred by decades of inaction and continued exposure to unsafe drinking 
water, community leaders from California’s disadvantaged communities1 (DACs) 
advocated for the creation of a human right to water2 under state law.3  Shortly 
 
 * Camille Pannu is the Director of the Water Justice Clinic, Aoki Center for Critical 
Race and Nation Studies at UC Davis School of Law.  I thank the residents of California’s 
disadvantaged communities, and the organizations that amplify their voices, for their tireless 
efforts to extend water justice to our state’s most vulnerable people.  Additionally, I thank 
Olivia Molodanof, Jessica Durney, and the Editors of the Hastings Environmental Law 
Journal for their patient and thoughtful editing.  All errors are, of course, my own. 
1. “Disadvantaged community” has become a legal term of art for an alternative 
poverty measure that compares a community’s relative socioeconomic status (median 
household income) to the statewide median household income level. See, e.g., CAL. WATER 
CODE § 79505.5(a). 
2. ASSEMB. B. 685, 2012 Leg. (Cal. 2012), codified at CAL. WATER CODE § 106.3(a) 
(“It is hereby declared to be the established policy of the state that every human being has 
the right to safe, clean, affordable, and accessible water adequate for human consumption, 
cooking, and sanitary purposes.”). 
3. California has long recognized that residential drinking water is the highest 
beneficial use within the State’s beneficial uses framework, CAL. CONST. art X, § 2; WATER 
CODE § 100.  See CAL. WATER CODE § 106, codifying Meridian, Ltd. v. City & Cty. of San 
Francisco, 13 Cal.2d 424, 450 (1939).  Nonetheless, prior to the passage of the Human Right 
to Water bill, several San Joaquin Valley local governments maintained that they had no 
obligation to protect domestic water use over agricultural irrigation, or to identify and 
provide access to safe, clean drinking water to rural residents.  See, e.g., TULARE CTY. 
PLANNING DEP’T, TULARE COUNTY GENERAL PLAN § 2.D.3 (1971) (setting forth a policy of 
“starving” disadvantaged unincorporated communities of funding); MADERA CTY. 
PLANNING DEP’T, Housing Element in MADERA COUNTY GENERAL PLAN (1969) (adopting a 
policy of directing funds away from rural communities and to cities); MADERA CTY. 
PLANNING DEP’T, Background Rep. in MADERA COUNTY GENERAL PLAN UPDATE, at 1-2 
(1995) (maintaining the 1969 Plan objectives, including disinvestment in rural 
communities); CHIONE FLEGAL ET AL., POLICYLINK, CALIFORNIA UNINCORPORATED: 
MAPPING DISADVANTAGED COMMUNITIES IN THE SAN JOAQUIN VALLEY 6, 19–20 (2013) 
(describing infrastructure deficits in unincorporated communities and their correlation with 
race); Michelle Wilde Anderson, Mapped Out of Local Democracy, 62 STAN. L. REV. 931, 
932–34 (2010) (describing the creation of concentrated poverty and racialized inequality 
through the denial of essential infrastructure to unincorporated communities adjacent to, or 
within the growth boundaries of, cities throughout the United States); Victor Rubin et al., 
Unincorporated Communities in the San Joaquin Valley: Responses to Poverty, Inequity, 
and a System of Unresponsive Governance, at 2, 5–6, 16, 18–19, 21–22 (2007) (unpublished 
report on file with author) (describing local governments’ lack of political will and financing 
capacity with respect to disadvantaged unincorporated communities). 
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thereafter, the California Legislature put forward a bond4 to finance much needed 
water infrastructure improvements and drought relief interventions across the state.  
Voters approved the $7.45 billion bond,5 which reserved millions of dollars of 
funding for DACs with persistent water quality problems.6  In setting aside those 
funds, the Legislature acknowledged that decades of disinvestment7 in rural, 
disadvantaged communities had created severe water contamination, limited water 
access, and degraded water infrastructure.8  The bond’s initiating legislation tacitly 
recognized that taxing DAC residents was futile;9 those residents had the fewest 
resources available to address the disinvestment that compounded their water 
inequality. 
 
4. ASSEMB. B. 1471, 2014  Leg. (Cal. 2014); CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, Proposition 1: 
Water Bond in CALIFORNIA 2014 GENERAL ELECTION OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE, 
http://vigarchive.sos.ca.gov/2014/general/en/propositions/1/  
[https://perma.cc/5RHN-6AHM]. 
5.  CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, NOVEMBER 4, 2014 GENERAL ELECTION STATEMENT OF 
VOTE 14 (2014).   
6.  ASSEMB. B. 1471, supra note 4, codified in relevant part at WATER CODE §§ 
79720–79725.  
7.  See generally Camille Pannu, Drinking Water and Exclusion: A Case Study from 
California’s Central Valley, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 223, 232–34 (2011) (suggesting that 
policies of withholding investment from disadvantaged unincorporated communities did not 
encourage consolidation, annexation, or relocation, but rather, “deepen[ed] infrastructure 
inequality and ultimately maintain[ed] bleak levels of poverty.”); Rubin et al., supra note 3, 
at 5–6; Laura Bliss, Before California’s Drought, a Century of Disparity, CITYLAB (Oct. 1, 
2015), https://www.citylab.com/environment/2015/10/before-californias-drought-a-centur 
y-of-disparity/407743/ [https://perma.cc/AKT2-75JM].  
8.  WATER CODE § 79721(c), (g)–(h). 
9.  Id. §§ 79724–25.  
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Nearly five years later, over one million10 Californians still lack access to 
clean, safe, and affordable drinking water.11  The majority of those Californians 
are Latinx and live in disadvantaged unincorporated communities (DUCs)12 
throughout the state’s rural agricultural belts.13  The greatest number of 
noncompliant public water systems is located in the San Joaquin Valley,14 where 
approximately forty percent of DUCs with noncompliant systems are located 
 
10. Yet that figure almost certainly underestimates the number of Californians 
exposed to unsafe drinking water.  In 2016, more than 18 million Californians lived within 
the boundaries of a water system that failed to monitor or report their water quality, meaning 
that for certain time periods, there is little to no water quality data available for a large subset 
of the population.  See State Water Res. Control Bd., 2016 Compliance Report dataset 
(2017) [hereinafter “2016 Compliance Report Dataset”].  The State Water Board’s Annual 
Compliance Report also does not include information for small water systems regulated 
under state law, Cal. Health & Safety Code § 116275(n), nor does it include water quality 
data for individuals who rely on private wells for drinking water.  STATE WATER RES. 
CONTROL BD., 2016 ANNUAL COMPLIANCE REPORT 3–4 (2017) [hereinafter “2016 
COMPLIANCE REPORT”].  Additionally, because the Annual Compliance Report focuses on 
water quality, testing, and public disclosure requirements and does not provide data on 
affordability, it is difficult to determine whether water is affordable and whether there is a 
correlation between unaffordable water and water quality.  For additional discussion of the 
affordability-water quality gap, see Brett Walton, California Hones Drinking Water 
Affordability Plan, CIRCLE OF BLUE (June 8, 2017); JULIET CHRISTIAN-SMITH ET AL., PAC. 
INST., ASSESSING WATER AFFORDABILITY: A PILOT STUDY IN TWO REGIONS OF CALIFORNIA 
10 (Aug. 2013) (finding 23% of Sacramento area households and 51% of Tulare Lake Basin 
households paid unaffordable water rates).  
11. See 2016 COMPLIANCE REPORT, supra note 10, at 2 (Table 1, Part A). 
12. Although “DAC” and “DUC” are often used interchangeably in policy discourse, 
there is a subtle but significant difference between the two terms.  In the context of 
California water policy, disadvantaged communities (DACs) can exist in rural areas and 
within cities.  WATER CODE § 79505.5(a); PUB. RES. CODE § 75005(g).  Disadvantaged 
unincorporated communities (DUCs), however, are not found within the incorporated 
territory of a city.  GOV’T CODE § 65302.10(a)(2)–(5).  In some cases, those unincorporated 
communities are entirely surrounded by a city but are not included within that city’s 
boundaries and are unable to vote in city elections.  Id. § 65302.10(a)(4).  
13. 2016 Compliance Report Dataset; State Water Res. Control Bd., Human Right to 
Water Dataset: Noncompliant Systems (2017) [hereinafter, “HRTW Dataset”]; see also 
JONATHAN LONDON ET AL., THE STRUGGLE FOR WATER JUSTICE IN CALIFORNIA’S SAN 
JOAQUIN VALLEY: A FOCUS ON DISADVANTAGED UNINCORPORATED COMMUNITIES REPORT 
30 (Feb. 2018), https://regionalchange.ucdavis.edu/publication/water-justice [https:// 
perma.cc/UYV4-RHY4].  With the exception of a water treatment lapse that affected 
3,987,622 Angelenos, violations with potential direct public health impacts affected 
1,007,055 Californians in 2016. 2016 COMPLIANCE REPORT, supra note 10, at 2, 16–17.  
Taken together, water contamination and treatment violations exposed 4,994,677 (12.6%) 
Californians to unsafe drinking water in 2016.  See 2016 Compliance Report dataset, supra 
note 10 (total population affected by contaminant and treatment violations); U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, CALIFORNIA: POPULATION (Dec. 21, 2017) (used to calculate the share of the 
population exposed to contaminant and treatment violations); 2016 COMPLIANCE REPORT, 
supra note 10, at 2, 16–17.  
14. See 2016 Compliance Report Dataset, supra note 10. 
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within a mile of a city’s borders, while one-third are too far15 from a city’s borders 
to extend drinking water service.16  These dire spatial and racial inequalities 
suggest that California must explore new strategies to augment current efforts to 
implement the human right to water. 
Despite the extensive number of noncompliant DUC water systems located 
far from any city’s boundaries, local government agencies, rural and community 
advocates, and state agency staff have primarily focused on working with cities to 
extend residential water service to nearby rural communities.17  To be sure, as the 
primary drivers of land-use planning and growth, cities play an important role in 
eliminating water inequality.  But ongoing racial and spatial disparities in access 
to safe drinking water suggest that although state programs have improved drinking 
water access for rural communities within one to three miles of a city boundary, 
policy and funding gaps persist.  
This commentary argues that advocates and policymakers must look to a 
broader array of possible water providers to redress water inequality in DUCs 
located more than three miles from a city’s borders.  It briefly describes the land 
development patterns that drove the creation of “remote DUCs,”18 and argues that 
the State must take into account those histories when addressing water inequality 
in those communities.  Finally, the commentary concludes with suggestions for 
policy changes that may engender sustainable solutions for remote DUCs.  
 
 
15. Although “far” is a relative term, I use it to refer to communities three or more 
miles from a city’s borders.  California’s drinking water funding programs often extend 
water infrastructure from a compliant system to a noncompliant system only if the 
population receiving service falls within three miles of an existing water system or source.  
In practice, extensions are often limited to systems within a mile of each other, increasing 
the share of “remote” DUCs to just over sixty percent.  See LONDON ET AL., supra note 13, 
at 32 (reporting that 61% of DUCs are located more than one mile from a city’s borders).  
16. LONDON ET AL., supra note 13, at 32. 
17. In 2015, the Legislature passed and the Governor signed California Senate Bill 
88, which authorized the State Water Resources Control Board to require that systems 
serving unsafe or unreliable drinking water to DUCs, or mutual water companies serving 
unsafe water to any disadvantaged community, consolidate with compliant systems.  Of the 
eleven DUC system consolidations that have been completed since Senate Bill 88 entered 
into force, all eleven occurred in the San Joaquin Valley, and eight (72.7%) involved 
connection to a city water system.  See STATE WATER RES. CONTROL BD., MANDATORY 
CONSOLIDATION OR EXTENSION OF SERVICE FOR DISADVANTAGED COMMUNITIES, 
https://www.waterboards.ca.gov/drinking_water/programs/compliance/index.html  
[https://perma.cc/8Q79-RZWM] (last updated Dec. 18, 2017, and last accessed Feb. 20, 
2018). 
18. Throughout this commentary, I refer to DUCs located more than three miles from 
a city’s borders as “remote DUCs.”  California law refers to DUCs that are landlocked by a 
city as “islands,” while those DUCs that share a border with a city are often referred to as 
“fringe” or “peripheral” communities. GOV’T CODE § 65302.10(a)(3)–(5); see also FLEGAL 
ET AL., supra note 3, at 21–22 (setting forth the framework for California’s DUC typology).  
Advocates have not agreed on a unified term to refer to DUCs located farther than three 
miles from a city’s borders. 
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A. DUCs May Be Remote, But Their Existence Is Not Random. 
In order to craft effective drinking water policy interventions, decision 
makers must take into account the historical development (and growth) of remote 
DUCs.  Although some policymakers have suggested that remote DUCs are 
byproducts of sprawl-based development, the majority of those DUCs predate 
contemporary urban boundaries.  Additionally, remote DUCs represent a sizable 
portion of the total number of DUCs throughout the state.  In the San Joaquin 
Valley, alone, approximately forty-four percent of DUCs (231 of 525) are 
remote—a figure roughly equal to the number of “fringe” DUCs.19  Both the 
number and location of remote DUCs suggest that their development occurred 
independently of urban development patterns.20 
Most remote DUCs formed during periods of economic expansion, and those 
communities remained close to industries that had formed through that expansion, 
even after local jobs moved or disappeared.  For example, the remote DUCs of 
Cortez and Cressey (Merced County) were originally established as Japanese 
farming colonies in the early 1900s, and both are located on what was then the 
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway (“Santa Fe”) line.21  Grayson (Stanislaus 
County), a remote DUC, was established in the 1860s and served as a thriving river 
port until water from the San Joaquin River was diverted for agricultural 
irrigation.22  The remote DUC of Allensworth (Tulare County) was founded in 
1908 along the Santa Fe line as the first African American freedom colony23 west 
of the Mississippi.24  Although the Allensworth train depot was ultimately 
removed, it still serves as a whistle stop for the Amtrak trains that travel along the 
 
19. FLEGAL ET AL., supra note 3, at 22. 
20. See Lauren Richter, Constructing insignificance: critical race perspectives on 
institutional failure in environmental justice communities, 4 ENVTL. SOCIOLOGY 107, 111–
12 (2017) (gathering sources).  
21. See generally VALERIE J. MATSUMOTO, FARMING THE HOME PLACE: A JAPANESE 
AMERICAN COMMUNITY IN CALIFORNIA, 1919–1982 (1993) (recounting the founding and 
development of three Japanese-American farming colonies, with special focus on Cortez). 
22. JERRY MACMULLEN, PADDLEWHEEL DAYS IN CALIFORNIA 81, 145 (1970).  
23. Freedom colonies were independent, rural settlements that African Americans 
created to enable land ownership and self-sufficiency, and after the Civil War, to escape the 
structural racism and violence of the Jim Crow South.  See generally THAD SITTON & JAMES 
H. CONRAD, FREEDOM COLONIES: INDEPENDENT BLACK TEXANS IN THE TIME OF JIM CROW 
(2005); PATRICIA C. CLICK, TIME FULL OF TRIAL: THE ROANOKE ISLAND FREEDMEN’S 
COLONY, 1862–1867 (2001); see also JESSICA GORDON NEMBHARD, COLLECTIVE COURAGE: 
A HISTORY OF AFRICAN AMERICAN COOPERATIVE ECONOMIC THOUGHT AND PRACTICE 34–
40 (2014) (discussing pre-Civil War African American farming colonies).  
24. ALICE C. ROYAL, ALLENSWORTH, THE FREEDOM COLONY: A CALIFORNIA 
AFRICAN AMERICAN TOWNSHIP 84–91 (1st ed. 2008); see also Leslie Fulbright, Battle for 
piece of black history: Allensworth, a town founded for African Americans, may get new 
neighbors–2 huge dairy farms, S.F. CHRON. (Jan. 8, 2007). 
  
Hastings Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 24, No. 2, Summer 2018 
 
258 
 
same freight lines that existed over 100 years ago.25  And in the Salinas Valley, the 
arrival of the Southern Pacific Railroad catalyzed local agricultural development 
by reducing the cost of shipping agricultural products.26  With the Southern 
Pacific’s extension in 1867 came the growth of several remote DUCs, including 
Chualar, Las Lomas, and Castroville.27  
Meanwhile, federal land policy laid the groundwork for the development of 
remote DUCs in the western San Joaquin Valley and in the Imperial Valley.28  The 
federal Reclamation Act of 1902 originally sought to break up land empires by 
dividing large farms into parcels of 160 acres for the creation of small farming 
homesteads.29  In addition to increasing the number of family farms, receipt of a 
federal allotment entitled the landowner to subsidized water provided by the 
Central Valley Project.30  Instead of creating small farms, however, the Bureau of 
Reclamation allowed nonresident land barons to create enormous farms well in 
excess of the original 160-acre limit.31  As those large-scale farming operations 
grew, so grew nearby settlements of agricultural workers.32  
 
25. Amtrak, Map: San Joaquins Line, https://www.amtrak.com/san-joaquins-train 
[https://perma.cc/9J6M-9H8E]; see generally, DAVID IGLER, INDUSTRIAL COWBOYS: 
MILLER & LUX AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FAR WEST, 1850–1920, at 60–91 (2d ed. 
2005) (discussing the history of railroad-driven land speculation, water rights accumulation, 
and development in California). 
26. City of Salinas, History, https://www.cityofsalinas.org/visitors/salinas-history 
[https://perma.cc/SM73-ZXX2]. 
27. DAVID L. DURHAM, CALIFORNIA’S GEOGRAPHIC NAMES: A GAZETTEER OF 
HISTORIC AND MODERN NAMES OF THE STATE 885 (1998). 
28. See Barcellos & Wolfsen, Inc. v. Westlands Water Dist., 899 F.2d 814, 815–17 
(9th Cir. 1990) (describing the history of the Reclamation Act); see also Yellen v. Hickel, 
352 F. Supp. 1300, 1306 (S.D. Cal. 1972) (although Yellen was later vacated as moot, it 
describes noncompliance with the Reclamation Act and the formation of agricultural land 
baronies in the Imperial Valley); see also Mary Louise Frampton, The Enforcement of 
Federal Reclamation Law in the Westlands Water District: A Broken Promise, 13 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 89, 91–103 (1979) (discussing the Bureau of Reclamation’s role in enabling 
large land conglomerates in the western San Joaquin Valley); Lloyd Carter, Reaping Riches 
in a Wretched Region: Subsidized Industrial Farming and Its Link to Perpetual Poverty, 3 
GOLDEN GATE U. ENVTL. L.J. 5, 6, 8–11, 14–16 (2009) (recounting the use of Reclamation 
Act lands to concentrate land ownership in the Westlands Water District); Paul S. Taylor, 
National Reclamation in Imperial Valley: Law v. Policy, 11 ECOLOGY L.Q. 125 (1983); 
Robert G. Schonfeld, The Early Development of California’s Imperial Valley: Part I, 50 S. 
CAL. Q. 279 (1968). 
29. 43 U.S.C. § 431 (1970). 
30. Id. 
31. Frampton, supra note 28, at 92–93; Carter, supra note 28, at 10–11, 13. In 1926, 
Congress amended the Reclamation Act to allow the Interior Department to sell water to 
farms with lands in excess of the original 160-acre limit.  See 43 U.S.C. § 423e.  
32. For example, the remote DUC of Westley was originally a farm worker labor 
camp. Stanislaus Cty., Brief History, UNINCORPORATED CITIES: WESTLEY, http://www.stan 
county.com/board/unincorporated-cities/westley.shtm [https://perma.cc/DTM4-36PW]. 
The remote DUCs of Cantua Creek and El Porvenir formed to provide labor for the grain 
harvest and to transport agricultural goods to market.  MACMULLEN, supra note 22. 
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Even after the removal of train depots and abandonment of river transport, 
agricultural enterprises and nearby DUCs persisted.  For some communities, 
persistence was an act of self-determination.33  For others, the collapse of local 
economic opportunity drove down real estate prices, depriving residents of their 
home equity and discouraging prospective buyers from moving into remote 
communities.34  When combined with exclusionary zoning, redlining, the siting of 
undesirable land uses, and a lack of affordable housing in cities,35 many remote 
DUCs became loci for concentrated rural poverty.36  
By miscategorizing remote DUCs as byproducts of contemporary, sprawl-
based development, decision makers have incorrectly assumed that remote DUCs 
share the same characteristics as fringe and island DUCs, which are geographically 
closer to cities.  As a result, California’s drinking water policies have chiefly 
focused on extending service from cities to remote DUCs.  
By acknowledging the decades-long relationship between industrial 
development (and later collapse), disinvestment, racial exclusion, and economic 
vulnerability, decision makers can reframe their understanding of the root causes 
of water inequality in remote DUCs.  At a practical level, a shift in framing would 
enable policymakers to consider a broader array of solution sets to address water 
inequality in remote DUCs. A historical examination of remote DUCs lays bare 
uncomfortable and painful histories in which elected officials and government 
employees used the deprivation of essential infrastructure—including drinking 
water—to subordinate low-income communities of color.  But in laying bare that 
history, we also uncover the moral and ethical imperatives that require us to redress 
persistent water inequality. 
 
 
 
33. See, e.g., MATSUMOTO, supra note 21; ROYAL, supra note 24. 
34. See Pannu, supra note 7, at 231–34, 236 (discussing the racially disparate 
demographics of rural poverty in the San Joaquin Valley, and the relationship between 
infrastructure disinvestment and property values).  
35. See Michelle Wilde Anderson, Cities Inside Out: Race, Poverty, and Exclusion 
at the Urban Fringe, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1095, 1106–13, 1118 (2008) (discussing the 
deprivation of public services, siting unhealthy land uses, inadequate affordable housing, 
racial inequality, and concentrated poverty in DUCs); see also Nancy L. Simmons, 
Memories and Miracles—Housing the Rural Poor Along the United States–Mexico Border: 
A Comparative Discussion of Colonia Formation and Remediation in El Paso County, 
Texas, and Doña Ana County, New Mexico, 27 N.M. L. REV. 33 (1997) (discussing housing 
and rural poverty among communities of color in fringe and remote DUCs); Craig Anthony 
Arnold, Planning for Environmental Justice, 59 PLANNING & ENVTL. L. 3, 3–4 (Mar. 2007) 
(discussing siting undesirable land uses in communities of color). 
36. See DANIEL T. LICHTER & DOMENICO PARISI, CARSEY INST., CONCENTRATED 
RURAL POVERTY AND THE GEOGRAPHY OF EXCLUSION 1–3 (Fall 2008); Pannu, supra note 7, 
at 231–34; Rubin et al., supra note 3, at 4–5. 
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B. When Considering How to Extend Safe Drinking Water to 
Rural Communities, Scholars and Policymakers Have 
Primarily Focused on Proximity to Cities. 
Policy discourse and interventions to address safe drinking water access in 
rural communities have primarily focused on the role of cities in extending service 
to, or annexing, fringe and island DUCs.  Academics and policymakers have 
rightfully noted that sustainable water planning has a land-use nexus,37 and that 
sprawl-based development38 that fails to account for water supplies risks creating 
or exacerbating local water insecurity.39  Local government scholars have 
suggested that water supply and quality must be integrated into the municipal 
planning process,40 arguing that cities’ historical and contemporary policies of 
 
37. See Sarah Bates, Bridging the Governance Gap: Emerging Strategies to 
Integrate Water and Land Use Planning, 52 NAT. RES. J. 61, 69–81 (2012); see also Lora 
A. Lucero, Water Supplies and Growth—The Elephant in the Living Room, 62 PLAN. & 
ENVTL. L. 3, 4, 6–7 (2010) (discussing planning paradigms that account for limited water 
supplies and the effects of climate change); A. Dan Tarlock & Sarah B. Van de Wetering, 
Water and Western Growth, 59 PLAN. & ENVTL. L. 3 (2007); Craig Anthony Arnold, Clean-
Water Land Use, 23 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 291 (2006); Nicole Carter et al., Closing the 
Circle: Linking Land Use Planning and Water Management at the Local Level, 22 LAND 
USE POL’Y 115 (2005); A. Dan Tarlock & Lora A. Lucero, Connecting Land, Water, and 
Growth, 34 URB. LAW. 971 (2002); Sarah J. Meyland, Land Use & the Protection of 
Drinking Water Supplies, 10 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 563 (1993); see also Patricia Gober et 
al., Why Land Planners and Water Managers Don’t Talk to One Another and Why They 
Should!, 26 SOC’Y & NAT. RES. 356 (2013).  For regional case studies that discuss the land-
use and water nexus, see Jean L. Coleman & Suzanne Sutro Rhees, Where Land and Water 
Meet: Opportunities for Integrating Minnesota Water and Land Use Planning Statutes for 
Water Sustainability, 39 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 920 (2013); Anita P. Miller, Rural 
Development Considerations for Growth Management, 43 NAT. RES. J. 781 (2003) 
(discussing the need to integrate water availability when considering rural growth in New 
Mexico); V.B. Price, Saved by Scarcity?, 42 NAT. RES. J. 1 (2002) (comparing 
Albuquerque’s growth model to other arid and desert cities). 
38. Craig Anthony Arnold, Adaptive Water Law, 62 U. KAN. L. REV. 1043 (2014); 
Craig Anthony Arnold, Fourth-Generation Environmental Law: Integrationist and 
Multimodal, 35 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 771, 837–41 (2011) (discussing “wet 
growth”). 
39. UN-Water defines water security as the capacity of a population to safeguard 
sustainable access to adequate quantities of acceptable quality water for sustaining 
livelihoods, human well-being, and socioeconomic development, for ensuring protection 
against water-borne pollution and water-related disasters, and for preserving ecosystems in 
a climate of peace and political stability.  WATER SECURITY & THE GLOBAL WATER AGENDA: 
A UN-WATER ANALYTICAL BRIEF (2013).  For greater discussion of the evolution and 
definitions of the term “water security,” see Christina Cook & Karen Bakker, Water 
security: Debating an emerging paradigm, 22 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 94 (2012). 
40. See Michelle Bryan Mudd, A Next, Big Step for the West: Using Model 
Legislation to Create a Water-Climate Element in Local Comprehensive Plans, 3 WASH. J. 
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1 (2013); Keith H. Hirokawa, Driving Local Governments to Watershed 
Governance, 42 ENVTL. L. 157, 165–73 (2012); Lincoln L. Davis, Assured Water Supply 
Laws in the Sustainability Context, 4 GOLDEN GATE U. ENVTL. L.J. 167 (2010); Ryan 
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racial exclusion have compounded inequality in fringe and island DUCs.41  That 
literature is vital for examining rural poverty in the context of its municipal42 
neighbors; nonetheless, it cannot fully explain persistent inequality in remote 
DUCs.  
As the only layer of general-purpose local government for remote DUCs, 
California’s county governments have been charged with providing essential 
services to those communities.  Despite that charge, in the San Joaquin Valley 
counties frequently prioritized investing in sprawl-based development at the urban 
fringe, often at the expense of investing in DUCs.43  That history, combined with 
 
Waterman, Addressing California’s Uncertain Water Future by Coordinating Long-Term 
Land Use and Water Planning: Is a Water Element in the General Plan the Next Step?, 31 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 117 (2004); but see S.B. 244, 2011 Leg. (Cal. 2011), codified in relevant 
part at GOV’T CODE § 56430 (requiring cities and counties to evaluate municipal services in 
disadvantaged island, fringe and remote DUCs and to examine extensions of service to those 
communities when evaluating a local government’s application to expand its sphere of 
influence—i.e., its growth boundary). 
41. Anderson, Mapped Out of Local Democracy, supra note 3, at 937–49; Emily 
Tumpson Molina, Race, Municipal Underbounding, and Coalitional Politics in Modesto, 
California and Moore County, North Carolina, 1 KALFOU 180, 181–85 (2014); Noah J. 
Durst, Municipal annexation and the selective underbounding of colonias in Texas’ Lower 
Rio Grande Valley, 46 ENVT. & PLANNING A 1699 (2014); Vinit Mukhija & David R. 
Mason, Reluctant Cities, Colonias and Municipal Underbounding in the US: Can Cities be 
Convinced to Annex Poor Enclaves?, 50 URB. STUD. 2959 (2013); Ben Marsh, Allan M. 
Parnell & Ann Moss Joyner, Institutionalization of Racial Inequality in Local Political 
Geographies, 31 URB. GEOGRAPHY 691 (2010); Malini Ranganathan & Carolina Balazs, 
Water marginalization at the urban fringe: environmental justice and urban political 
ecology across the North–South divide, 36 URB. GEOGRAPHY 403, 407–08 (2015); 
Anderson, Cities Inside Out, supra note 35, at 1106–13; Daniel T. Lichter & Domenico 
Parisi, Municipal Underbounding: Annexation and Racial Exclusion in Small Southern 
Towns, 72 RURAL SOC. 47 (2007); see also The Committee Concerning Community 
Improvement v. City of Modesto, 583 F.3d 690, 703–05, 707–09 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding 
that residents of four majority-Latino unincorporated communities stated a viable claim that 
the City of Modesto and County of Stanislaus engaged in intentional, racially discriminatory 
policies to prevent those communities’ annexation and to deny those communities access to 
adequate emergency response services). 
42. I use the term “municipal” to refer to general-purpose local governments that are 
“incorporated place[s] . . . established to provide governmental functions for a concentration 
of people.” U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Population of Interest—Municipalities and Townships, 
LISTS & STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENTS, https://www.census.gov/govs/go/municipal_ 
township_govs.html [https://perma.cc/WWL3-7HRW] (last revised Mar. 2, 2016). 
43. In several communities, counties reallocated income derived from rural property 
taxes to sprawl-based development on the periphery of cities.  See, e.g., MADERA CTY. 
PLANNING DEP’T, Housing Element and Background Report, supra note 3 (redirecting rural 
tax monies to cities by funding the development of new housing near the boundaries of those 
cities); Rubin et al., supra note 3, at 5–6, 16, 18–19, 21–22 (describing local governments’ 
refusals to address lack of access to essential infrastructure in San Joaquin Valley DUCs); 
Jody Murray, Watch three decades of urban sprawl in Fresno and Clovis, squeezed into a 
few seconds, FRESNO BEE (Aug. 17, 2017), http://www.fresnobee.com/news/local/article 
167829902.html [https://perma.cc/P47Z-ELKC]; see also Alex Karner, Can California’s 
San Joaquin Valley Conquer Urban Sprawl? (Essay), ZÓCALO PUBLIC SQUARE, (July 1, 
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the prevalence of remote DUCs, suggests that cities cannot address the full range 
of DUCs facing drinking water deficits.44  Additionally, even cities that wish to 
extend drinking water service are often stymied by the high cost of those projects 
because of California’s tax regime.  Consequently, policymakers must broaden 
their focus to consider the role of other local governmental entities and other 
regulated water providers to bridge the safe drinking water gap in remote DUCs. 
 
C. Policymakers Must Consider a Wider Array of Funding 
Tools and Potential Water Providers in Order to Extend 
Safe Drinking Water to Remote DUCs. 
As discussed above, several systemic constraints45 undermine efforts to 
provide safe drinking water to remote DUCs: distance from cities with safe 
drinking water, inadequate funding, and the high cost of creating, replacing and 
improving drinking water infrastructure.  This section proposes solutions for 
overcoming those hurdles and ensuring safe drinking water reaches remote DUCs. 
 
 
2014), http://www.zocalopublicsquare.org/2014/07/01/can-californias-san-joaquin-valley-
conquer-urban-sprawl/ideas/nexus [https://perma.cc/HC4A-GEGM]; David Garcia, Why 
it’s time for Central Valley cities to stop urban sprawl, op-ed, CENT. VALLEY BUSINESS J. 
(Sept. 1, 2013), https://cvbj.biz/2013/09/01/time-central-valley-cities-stop-urban-sprawl/ 
[https://perma.cc/8Y34-J8ER]; Michelle Wilde Anderson, Sprawl’s Shepherd: The Rural 
County (Essay), 100 CALIF. L. REV. 365 (2012); Christopher Silveira, An Urban 
Morphology of Fresno, California: Its Structure and Growth, at 44–47, 54–55 (2010) 
(unpublished undergraduate honors thesis, on file with author); see also Committee 
Concerning Community Improvement, 583 F.3d at 697–98 (discussing plaintiff’s argument 
that exclusion from property tax agreements between the City of Modesto and County of 
Stanislaus, enabled racially exclusive annexation policies with respect to fringe and island 
DUCs).  In other cases, counties purposefully withheld infrastructure funding with the 
intention of making DUCs so uninhabitable that they would collapse.  See TULARE CTY. 
PLANNING DEP’T, supra note 3, at § 2.D.3 (describing intention to deprive disadvantaged 
unincorporated communities of funding and infrastructure investment).  Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, those approaches did not cause DUCs to collapse, but instead, further 
deepened rural poverty. 
44. A recent study addressing water inequality in all San Joaquin Valley DUCs found 
that 27 percent of DUC residents who lack access to safe water live within 500 feet of a city 
boundary and within its sphere of influence.  LONDON ET AL., supra note 13, at 32.  Another 
12 percent of DUC residents with unsafe drinking water live within a mile of a city 
boundary, although primarily outside of those cities’ spheres of influence.  Id.  That data 
suggests that the majority of DUC residents with unsafe drinking water—61 percent—live 
more than a mile outside of a city boundary.  Those findings indicate that although cities 
play an important role in extending access to safe drinking water, a city-centric approach 
alone cannot meet the needs of the majority of DUC residents without safe drinking water. 
45. Although this commentary addresses institutional and systemic barriers to 
delivering safe drinking water to rural communities, it is important to note that those barriers 
are reinforced by additional anthropogenic impacts on water quantity and quality, including: 
large-scale water infrastructure and transport programs; widespread and unremediated 
industrial and agricultural pollution; climate change; and groundwater overdraft. 
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1. The State Water Resources Control Board Should Identify Possible 
Partnerships Between Community Water Systems, Water Districts, and 
Remote DUCs. 
 
Although the State Water Resources Control Board (“State Water Board”) 
has made progress in returning noncompliant46 drinking water systems to 
compliance,47 out-of-compliance water systems continue to deliver unsafe water 
to thousands of Californians.48  Additionally, the focus on bringing water systems 
into compliance often fails to address the water safety concerns facing rural 
residents who receive unsafe water from private wells.49 
New research suggests that two-thirds of DUC residents live within 500 feet 
of a compliant water system, and approximately 87 percent of DUC residents live 
within three miles of a compliant water system.50  In light of that information, 
policymakers should shift their focus to identifying proximate and compliant water 
systems when attempting to address unsafe drinking water in remote DUCs.  This 
shift would require looking beyond cities to identify other compliant drinking 
water providers, such as mutual water companies, community services districts, 
municipal utilities districts, and state small systems.51 
 
46. All drinking water systems with at least 15 connections, or at least 25 people who 
receive water each day for sixty days each year, fall within the regulatory framework of the 
federal Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f–300j-27. Id. at § 300f(4)(A) (defining 
“public water system”).  Systems with 5 to 14 connections are regulated as “state small 
water systems,” Cal. Health & Safety Code § 116275(n), under the California Safe Drinking 
Water Act, id. §§ 116270–725 (2017).  A regulated water system is “compliant” if it meets 
federal and state drinking water requirements, and it is “noncompliant” if it fails to meet 
those standards.  See Id. § 116287. 
47. See HRTW Dataset, supra note 13 (categorizing compliant, noncompliant, and 
“returned to compliance” drinking water systems). 
48. Id. 
49. To be sure, data regarding water quality for individual domestic wells is sparse, 
making it difficult even to identify at-risk private well communities. Additionally, regulators 
often struggle to navigate the difficult line between protecting public health and disrupting 
any private property rights related to use of an unsafe private well for that property owner’s 
drinking water needs. 
50. LONDON ET AL., supra note 13, at 31–41.  
51. The lion’s share of DUC consolidations and extensions of service have involved 
cities.  See STATE WATER RES. CONTROL BD., MANDATORY CONSOLIDATION, supra note 17; 
see also STATE WATER RES. CONTROL BD., Consolidation Funding Projects for 
Disadvantaged Water Systems with Violations Dataset, CONSOLIDATION STATISTICS, 
https://www.waterboards.ca.gov/drinking_water/certlic/drinkingwater/dashboard.html 
[https://perma.cc/XC98-QLQ4]. When examining the broader universe of water system 
consolidations, however, mutual water companies, community services districts and public 
utility districts have played an important supplemental role.  STATE WATER RES. CONTROL 
BD., Consolidated Water Systems List: Completed Consolidations Beginning January 1, 
2017 and December 31, 2017, CONSOLIDATION STATISTICS, https://www.waterboards. 
ca.gov/drinking_water/certlic/drinkingwater/dashboard.html [https://perma.cc/97TT-W 
UTR]. 
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Those water systems that are proximate to remote DUCs have a geographic 
advantage in that they may be able to provide more cost-effective extensions of 
service.  At the same time, increasing the number of water users for those systems 
can also have a stabilizing effect for the receiving system—a larger number of 
ratepayers increases economies of scale, thereby decreasing the fixed costs of water 
provision for all residents of that water system.  
The State Water Board may also increase access to safe water by evaluating 
partnerships between nonresidential water districts,52 such as irrigation districts, 
and remote DUCs.  In some cases, water exchanges that enable water mixing may 
dilute water contaminants that are especially expensive to treat.  For example, the 
remote DUCs of Allensworth53 and Alpaugh54 have faced ongoing challenges in 
addressing arsenic contamination for decades.  Those communities jointly applied 
 
52. The State Water Board has reported consolidations involving irrigation districts 
for commercial drinking water provision, but thus far, there have been very few, if any, non-
consolidation partnerships between irrigation districts and residential drinking water 
providers.  See STATE WATER RES. CONTROL BD., Consolidated Water Systems List, supra 
note 51. 
53. See STATE WATER RES. CONTROL BD., Sampling Results: Well 01 - East - Raw, 
CAL. DRINKING WATER WATCH, https://sdwis.waterboards.ca.gov/PDWW/JSP/Sampling 
ResultsByStoret.jsp?SystemNumber=5400544&SamplingPointID=002&SamplingPointNa
me=WELL+01+++EAST++RAW&Storet=&ChemicalName=&begin_date=&end_date=
%20(2018) [https://perma.cc/BGV2-APUY] (providing pretreatment contaminant levels for 
Allensworth’s east well); STATE WATER RES. CONTROL BD., Sampling Results: Well 01 - 
West - Raw, CAL. DRINKING WATER WATCH, https://sdwis.waterboards.ca.gov/PDWW/ 
JSP/SamplingResultsByStoret.jsp?SystemNumber=5400544&SamplingPointID=003&Sa
mplingPointName=WELL+02+++WEST++RAW&Storet=&ChemicalName=&begin_dat
e=&end_date=%20%20(2018) [https://perma.cc/S99W-88FS] (reporting pretreatment 
contaminant levels for Allensworth’s west well); see also Tammerlin Drummond, A Lost 
Horizon: Allensworth was an ex-slave who envisioned a place where blacks could live 
freely. Racism and hard times eventually killed his utopia. But its memory has survived, 
L.A. TIMES (Nov. 17, 1991). 
54. STATE WATER RES. CONTROL BD., Sampling Results: Well 01 Raw, CAL. 
DRINKING WATER WATCH, https://sdwis.waterboards.ca.gov/PDWW/JSP/Sampling 
ResultsByStoret.jsp?SystemNumber=5410050&SamplingPointID=004&SamplingPointNa
me=WELL+01++RAW&Storet=&ChemicalName=&begin_date=&end_date=%20(2018) 
[https://perma.cc/99ES-GED6] (arsenic levels for one of Alpaugh’s source wells); STATE 
WATER RES. CONTROL BD., Sampling Results: Well 10 Raw, CAL. DRINKING WATER 
WATCH, https://sdwis.waterboards.ca.gov/PDWW/JSP/SamplingResultsByStoret.jsp? Sys 
temNumber=5410050&SamplingPointID=003&SamplingPointName=WELL+10++RAW
&Storet=&ChemicalName=&begin_date=&end_date=%20(2018) [https://perma.cc/37 
DQ-HS35] (arsenic levels Alpaugh’s second source well); see also Jessica Peres, 
Contaminated Alpaugh Water: High Levels of Arsenic in the City’s Water, ABC 30 ACTION 
NEWS KFSN-TV (July 30, 2008), http://abc30.com/archive/6297435 [https://perma.cc 
/ZCE5-JMTP]; Holly Kernan, Calif. Town Fights for Clean Tap Water, NATL. PUB. RADIO 
(Jan. 24, 2005), https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4463526 [https:/ 
/perma.cc/D6FW-3MX3]. 
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for state funding55 to explore the feasibility of a pilot program that would allow 
water mixing at a one-to-one exchange rate with an irrigation district with water 
that fell within the maximum contaminant level for arsenic.56  Although the pilot 
project ultimately did not result in a water-exchange program,57 it provided an 
alternative framework for collaboration across domestic and nondomestic water 
districts.58  That framework may become increasingly useful as communities 
undertake the groundwater sustainability planning process.59  
 
2. In the Absence of Tax Reform, the State Must Commit to Creating 
Ongoing Funding to Support Access to Safe Drinking Water for All DACs. 
 
Perhaps the single greatest impediment to achieving safe drinking water is 
the high cost of water infrastructure improvement, repair, and replacement.  Recent 
projects repairing or replacing water distribution pipelines have ranged from $1.1 
million and $4.45 million per mile of pipeline laid.60  In addition to those high 
 
55. CAL. NAT. RES. AGENCY, AAA Water and MT Sewer Project, BOND 
ACCOUNTABILITY (2015), http://bondaccountability.resources.ca.gov/Project.aspx?Project 
PK=3793&PropositionPK=4 [https://perma.cc/R8GU-9JMJ]. 
56. Bernice Yeung, California Drinking Water: Rural Towns Devise Unique Plan to 
Solve Problems, CAL. WATCH (May 14, 2012).  
57. CAL. NAT. RES. AGENCY, Alpaugh CSD Arsenic Treatment—Construction 
Project, BOND ACCOUNTABILITY, http://bondaccountability.resources.ca.gov/Project.aspx? 
ProjectPK=22101&PropositionPK=48 [https://perma.cc/K7UH-AV53] (reporting the 
allocation of Prop 1 funding for the purposes of creating an arsenic treatment plant in 
Alpaugh). 
58. The remote Tulare County DUCs of East Orosi, Monson, Seville, Sultana, and 
Yettem have explored the possibility of partnering with the Alta Irrigation District to 
develop long-term, regional solutions for delivering safe and affordable drinking water.  
COMMUNITY WATER CTR., NORTHERN TULARE COUNTY REGIONAL SAFE DRINKING WATER 
PROJECT (Oct. 2017), https://www.communitywatercenter.org/northern_tulare_county 
_region [https://perma.cc/3FMH-4UDS].   
59. California’s Sustainable Groundwater Management Act (SGMA) requires 
groundwater users to develop groundwater sustainability plans, which in turn will require 
coordination between those users to achieve their sustainability goals. WATER CODE § 
10727. 
60. See EAST BAY MUN. UTIL. DIST., PIPELINE REPAIRS REVEAL WATER LEGACY, 
https://www.ebmud.com/about-us/construction-myneighborhood/pipeline-repairs-reveal-
water-legacy [https://perma.cc/AWB7-NGG8] (stating that the average cost to replace a 
mile of water transmission pipe is $2.4 million); EAST BAY MUN. UTIL. DIST., $4 Million 
Grant Awarded to Expand San Ramon Valley Recycled Water Program, PRESS RELEASES 
(Nov. 7, 2014), https://www.ebmud.com/about-us/news/press-releases/4-million-grant-
awarded-expand-san-ramon-valley-recycled-water-program [https://perma.cc/836T-LEVJ] 
(reporting that the cost of a nearly nine-mile pipeline extension was $11.8 million, or 
approximately $1.3 million per mile of pipe); SACRAMENTO SUBURBAN WATER DISTRICT, 
WATER TRANSMISSION MAIN ASSET MANAGEMENT PLAN 40 (Aug. 2011) (estimating the 
cost of water distribution pipeline replacement at $1.1 million per mile for a 16” pipeline to 
$4.45 million per mile for a 54” pipeline in 2011 dollars).  Those estimates appear to be 
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costs, California Proposition 21861 prohibits local governments from levying any 
special tax or assessment on a property if that assessment does not confer a “special 
benefit” to the property being taxed.62  California courts have interpreted that 
prohibition strictly—they have repeatedly struck down assessments that failed to 
confer specific benefits to the individual property being taxed.63  That prohibition 
has stymied counties and other local governments that have attempted to 
redistribute funding within their borders to address historic and persistent 
inequality in the provision of essential infrastructure.  
As a result, disadvantaged communities are faced with shouldering the full 
cost of improving their water infrastructure.  Proposition 218’s provisions fail to 
account for prior histories of racial discrimination and disinvestment, and those 
provisions penalize communities for their own poverty.  This outcome is punitive 
and futile: if disadvantaged communities had the financial means to repair their 
water systems,64 they likely would not meet the definition of “disadvantaged” set 
forth by the Legislature.  
 
limited to the cost of labor and construction and do not include additional transactional costs, 
such as purchasing easements or regulatory compliance. 
61. CAL. CONST. arts. XIII C, XIII D (1996); see CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, NOVEMBER 
5, 1996 GENERAL ELECTION STATEMENT OF VOTE 43–45 (1996) (reporting the passage of 
Proposition 218). 
62. CAL. CONST. art. XIII D, §§ 4 & 6; see generally CAL. DEBT & INVESTMENT 
ADVISORY COMM., OPPORTUNITIES TO USE ASSESSMENT DISTRICTS TO FINANCE FACILITIES 
AND SERVICES IN CALIFORNIA TODAY, No. 15–07 (2015), http://www.treasurer.ca.gov/cdiac 
/publications/opportunities.pdf [https://perma.cc/V4GY-BRDH] (explaining Proposition 
218’s requirements and limitations on property taxation and public debt). 
63. Silicon Valley Taxpayers’ Ass’n v. Santa Clara Cty. Open Space Auth., 44 Cal. 
4th 431, 441–43, 449–52 (2008); Town of Tiburon v. Bonander, 180 Cal. App. 4th 1057, 
1080–88 (2009). 
64. One of the most disturbing examples of Proposition 218’s punitive effect can be 
found in the remote DUC of Lanare (Fresno County).  After years of grappling with unsafe 
drinking water, Fresno County applied for funding to construct an arsenic treatment plant in 
Lanare.  In obtaining that funding, neither the County nor the State Water Board examined 
whether residents had the means to pay for the high cost of running the treatment plant 
through increased water rates, driving the Lanare Community Services District into a 
receivership.  Years later, the arsenic treatment plant remains closed while residents 
continue to receive unsafe water and struggle to pay the debts incurred from the plant’s 
creation.  Ezra David Romero & Kerry Klein, They Built It, But Couldn’t Afford to Run It—
Clean Drinking Water Fight Focuses on Gaps in Funding, VALLEY PUB. RADIO (June 6, 
2017), http://kvpr.org/post/they-built-it-couldn-t-afford-run-it-clean-drinking-water-fight-
focuses-gaps-funding [https://perma.cc/UN5Q-G8HL]; Laura Bliss, Why California’s 
Poorest Towns Still Can’t Connect to Water, CITYLAB (Oct. 8, 2015), https://www.citylab 
.com/equity/2015/10/why-californias-poorest-towns-still-cant-connect-to-water/409516/ 
[https://perma.cc/L4WQ-3BF5]; Alice Daniel, Central Valley Community Fights for Clean 
Drinking Water, KQED (Nov. 18, 2013), https://www.kqed.org/stateofhealth/16161/ 
central-valley-community-fight s-for-clean-water [https://perma.cc/E9XG-6WUR]; David 
Bacon, Dying for a Glass of Clean Water in California’s San Joaquin Valley (Photo Essay), 
New America Media (Aug. 26, 2011), http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/2939-dying-for-
a-glass-of-clean-water-in-california%E2%80%99s-san-joaquin-valley [https://perma.cc/G5 
GT-BJTF].  
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In light of the slim possibility that Californians will reform their tax regime,65 
the State must step up to bridge funding gaps related to safe and affordable drinking 
water provision in DUCs.  Those funding efforts should provide ongoing funding 
for system consolidation and regionalization,66 water infrastructure planning and 
construction, and stopgap support for operations and maintenance for DUCs whose 
residents cannot afford paying increased rates if their water is remediated.67  
Whether that funding takes the form of bonds, fees, or set-asides from the General 
Fund, the State must commit resources in order to effectuate the human right to 
water in DACs.  
 
3. State Funding Programs Should Increase Set Asides for DACs and Raise 
Current Caps on Funding. 
 
At the direction of the Legislature, the State Water Board has set aside some 
bond-financed grant funds exclusively for DACs.68  As the implementation of 
Proposition 1 has demonstrated, however, those grant programs did not have 
adequate funding to address unsafe water in DACs throughout the State.  Although 
the State Water Board has prioritized and incentivized funding for infrastructure 
 
65. Liam Dillon, A major change to Proposition 13 takes its first step toward the 
2018 ballot, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 15, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/politics/essential/la-pol-
ca-essential-politics-updates-a-major-change-to-proposition-13-takes-1513368938-htmlsto 
ry.html [https://perma.cc/W9K8-3T98]. 
66. In the context of California water policy, “consolidation” is a term of art that 
refers to “joining two or more public water systems, state small water systems, or affected 
residents not served by a public water system, into a single public water system.” CAL. 
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 116681(e).  “Reorganization” is a local government term of art 
under the Cortese-Knox-Hertzberg Local Government Reorganization Act of 2000, Gov’t 
Code §§ 56000–57550, which defines a “reorganization” as any application to undertake 
“two or more changes of [local government] organization within a single proposal”—e.g., 
the merger of three or more special districts into a single local government entity.  GOV’T 
CODE § 56073; see also id. § 56021 (providing a list of possible changes of organization). 
67. Lawmakers have introduced legislation to address some of those funding needs 
this year.  For example, Senate Bill 5, a bond measure that includes funding for water 
infrastructure with set asides for DACs, will be referred to voters as Proposition 68.  CAL. 
SEC’Y OF STATE, QUALIFIED STATEWIDE BALLOT MEASURES, http://www.sos.ca.gov/elec 
tions/ballot-measures/qualified-ballot-measures [https://perma.cc/E2J3-FKSQ] (last visited 
Feb. 20, 2018).  
68. See, e.g., WATER CODE § 79724–79725 (setting aside funds to improve drinking 
water infrastructure for DACs); id. § 79742(d) (setting aside 10% of funds related to 
integrated regional water management planning for climate change and regional water 
security for DACs at the state level); Id. § 79745 (same, applying the 10% set aside to each 
hydrological region of the state); Id. § 79774(d) (setting aside funds for the prevention and 
cleanup of groundwater used as a source of drinking water); see also id. § 79723 
(prioritizing, but not setting aside, funds for wastewater infrastructure projects serving 
DACs); PUB. RES. CODE § 75022 (2018) (prioritizing drinking water infrastructure funding 
for DACs).  
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improvements that benefit DACs,69 insofar as it has the authority to do so, it should 
utilize its rulemaking authority to reserve additional funds across its programs for 
drinking water projects that serve DAC. 
Additionally, as the State Water Board revises the Drinking Water State 
Revolving Fund70 intended use plan (IUP),71 it should revisit its per-connection 
limits on funding for DACs.  Under the current IUP, the State Board may only 
spend $30,000 per connection to address water safety issues for a community, and 
it may award up to $60,000 per connection for projects that provide a “regional 
benefit.”72  This formulation falls short of serving remote DUCs’ needs in at least 
three ways.  First, the $30,000 per connection award is often much lower than the 
cost of connecting a DUC to a compliant system or constructing new infrastructure 
to bring a system into compliance.  Second, it ignores remote DUCs’ geographic 
isolation, making it difficult for those communities to qualify for “regional benefit” 
funding because those remote DUCs often are not proximate to more than one other 
water system.  Third, the current funding caps do not take into account remote 
DUCs’ long histories of racial exclusion and disinvestment.  
The State cannot fix decades of disinvestment in low-income communities 
by capping support at $30,000, or even $60,000, per connection.73  As part of its 
 
69. STATE WATER RES. CONTROL BD., STATE OF CALIFORNIA DRINKING WATER 
STATE REVOLVING FUND AND THE WATER QUALITY, SUPPLY, AND INFRASTRUCTURE 
IMPROVEMENT ACT OF 2014 INTENDED USE PLAN: STATE FISCAL YEAR 2017–18, at 43–45 
(June 20, 2017), available at https://www.waterboards.ca.gov/board_decisions/adop 
ted_orders/resolutions/2017/dwsrf_iup_sfy2017_18_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/MP2Z-
KFLX] [hereinafter “2017–18 INTENDED USE PLAN”]. 
70. The Safe Drinking Water State Revolving Fund is a program jointly funded by 
the federal and state government and administered by the State Water Resources Control 
Board.  42 U.S.C. § 300j-12 (2012); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 116760–116762.60 
(2018). 
71. States that participate in the revolving fund program are required to produce and 
share for public review annual intended use plans.  42 U.S.C. § 300j-12(b) (2012). 
72. 2017-18 INTENDED USE PLAN, supra note 69, at 39–43.  The “regional benefit” 
usually applies to water system consolidations involving three or more drinking water 
providers.  Id.  It is important to credit State Water Board staff for their efforts to address 
the unique harms facing DUCs broadly and remote DUCs in particular.  Nevertheless, 
although staff may recommend that the State Water Board lift the per-connection funding 
cap on a project-by-project basis, staff do not have the authority or discretion to lift the per-
connection cap to account for historic disinvestment, rurality, or the severity of a water 
quality problems in DUCs and DACs. 
73. For example, in the remote DUC of Seville (Tulare County), emergency repairs 
to the water distribution system cost roughly $66,667 per connection for 75 service 
connections serving approximately 480 residents.  State Water Res. Control Bd., Report & 
Resolution Authorizing the Deputy Director of the Division of Financial Assistance to 
Provide Proposition 1 Drinking Water Grant Funding to Tulare County for the Replacement 
of Seville Water Company’s Distribution System in an Amount Not to Exceed $5 Million 
(Jan. 4, 2017), https://www.waterboards.ca.gov/board_info/agendas/2017/jan/010417_3 
.pdf; see State Water Res. Control Bd., SWRCB Board Meeting – January 4, 2017, 
YOUTUBE (published Jan. 4, 2017), https://youtu.be/kHCKeq3E0a0?t=24m25s [https://per 
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process for setting a per-connection cap, the State Water Board should evaluate its 
prior efforts to award funds to remote DUCs and the value of its prior awards to 
those communities, and determine the average cost of those projects based on 
varying population levels.  Those average cost estimates have greater predictive 
value, and may be better instruments for determining project funding, than a per-
connection funding cap.  Additionally, the Board should determine if remote DUCs 
experienced historical disinvestment and should calculate the estimated value of 
those years of disinvestment when considering whether to grant funds in excess of 
current per-connection caps.  Finally, when assessing how to distribute its funds, 
the State Water Board should explicitly prioritize funding projects in vulnerable 
communities that were subjected to disinvestment. 
Conclusion 
Over the past decade, California has made tremendous strides in attempting 
to address water poverty throughout the State.  Nonetheless, after a decade of water 
infrastructure investment projects, tens of thousands of low-income Californians 
still have not received safe and affordable drinking water, and those water deficits 
are especially severe in disadvantaged unincorporated communities.  The gap 
between the State’s funding programs and access to safe drinking water for DUC 
residents suggests that the State must look to a wider array of policy prescriptions 
in order to realize its commitment to advancing the human right to water for all 
Californians. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ma.cc/KBG7-XY4T] (discussion and unanimous approval of the resolution take place 
between minutes 24:25 and 34:18 of the recording). 
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